Chapter 45. Restraints of Trade.


  • Current through October 23, 2012
  • (a) As used in this chapter, the term "person" includes an individual, corporation, business trust, partnership, business association, or any other legal entity.

    (b) The purpose of this chapter is to promote the unhampered freedom of commerce and industry throughout the District of Columbia by prohibiting restraints of trade and monopolistic practices.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4501.

    Legislative History of Laws

    Law 3-169, the "District of Columbia Antitrust Act of 1980," was introduced in Council and assigned Bill No. 3-107, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The Bill was adopted on first and second readings on October 28, 1980 and November 12, 1980, respectively. Signed by the Mayor on November 25, 1980, it was assigned Act No. 3-300 and transmitted to both Houses of Congress for its review.

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  • Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce all or any part of which is within the District of Columbia is declared to be illegal.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4502.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce, all or any part of which is within the District of Columbia.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4503.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • (a) Labor of a human being is not a commodity or an article of commerce. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.

    (b) This chapter does not make illegal the activity of:

    (1) any non-profit corporation, trust, or organization established exclusively for religious, charitable, literary, or educational purposes to the extent that the activity is religious, charitable, literary, or educational; or

    (2) the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4504.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • (a) Whenever the Corporation Counsel has reason to believe that any person may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material, or may have any information, relevant to a civil antitrust investigation, the Corporation Counsel may, prior to the institution of a proceeding thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon such person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person to produce such documentary material for inspection and copying or reproduction, to answer written interrogatories, to give oral testimony concerning documentary material or information, or to furnish any combination of such material, answers, or testimony.

    (b) Each such demand shall:

    (1) state the nature of:

    (A) the conduct under investigation constituting the alleged antitrust violation; or

    (B) the activities under investigation which, if consummated, may result in an antitrust violation; and

    (C) the applicable provision of law;

    (2) if it is a demand for production of documentary material:

    (A) describe the class or classes of documentary material to be produced with sufficient definiteness as to permit such material to be fairly identified;

    (B) prescribe a return date or dates which will provide a reasonable period of time for the material demanded to be assembled and made available for inspection and copying or reproduction; and

    (C) identify the custodian to whom such material shall be made available;

    (3) if it is a demand for answers to written interrogatories:

    (A) propound with definiteness the written interrogatories to be answered;

    (B) prescribe a date or dates at which time answers to written interrogatories shall be submitted; and

    (C) identify the custodian to whom such answers shall be submitted; or

    (4) if it is a demand for the giving of oral testimony:

    (A) prescribe a date, time, and place at which oral testimony shall be commenced; and

    (B) identify an assistant corporation counsel who shall conduct the examination and the custodian to whom the transcript of such examination shall be submitted.

    (c) No such demand shall require the production of any documentary material, the submission of any answers to written interrogatories, or the giving of any oral testimony, if such material, answers, or testimony would be protected from disclosure under:

    (1) the standards applicable to subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in aid of a grand jury investigation; or

    (2) the standards applicable to discovery requests under the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that the application of such standards to any such demand is appropriate and consistent with the provisions and purposes of this chapter.

    (d) Any such demand shall be served in any manner provided for service of process in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, or if the person to be served has no place of business within the District of Columbia, the demand may be served by depositing a duly executed copy in the United States mails by registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to such person at that person's principal office or place of business.

    (e) The production of documentary material in response to a demand served pursuant to this section shall be made under a sworn certificate, in such form as the demand designates, by the person, if a natural person, to whom the demand is directed or, if not a natural person, by a person or persons having knowledge of the facts and circumstances relating to such production, to the effect that all of the documentary material required by the demand and in the possession, custody, or control of the person to whom the demand is directed has been produced and made available to the custodian.

    (f) Each interrogatory in a demand served pursuant to this section shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath, unless such procedure is objected to, in which event the reasons for the objection shall be stated with specificity in lieu of an answer, and such reasons shall be submitted under a sworn certificate.

    (g)(1) The examination of any person pursuant to a demand for oral testimony served under this section shall be taken before an officer authorized to administer oaths and affirmations by the laws of the District of Columbia. The officer before whom the testimony is to be taken shall put the witness on oath or affirmation and shall personally, or by someone acting under the officer's direction and in the officer's presence, record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be recorded and transcribed. When the testimony is fully transcribed, the officer before whom the testimony is taken shall promptly transmit a copy of the transcript of the testimony to the custodian.

    (2) The assistant corporation counsel conducting the examination shall exclude from the place where the examination is held all other persons: except, the person being examined, the person's counsel, the officer before whom the testimony is to be taken, and any stenographer taking such testimony.

    (3) The oral testimony of any person taken pursuant to a demand served under this section shall be taken in the District of Columbia, or in such other place as may be agreed upon by the assistant corporation counsel conducting the examination and such person.

    (4) When the testimony is fully transcribed, the assistant corporation counsel or the officer shall afford the witness (who may be accompanied by counsel) a reasonable opportunity to examine the transcript; and the transcript shall be read to or by the witness, unless such examination and reading are waived by the witness. Any changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make shall be entered and identified upon the transcript by the officer or the assistant corporation counsel with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making such changes. The transcript shall then be signed by the witness, unless the witness in writing waives the signing, is ill, cannot be found, or refuses to sign. If the transcript is not signed by the witness within 30 days of the witness being afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine the transcript, the officer or the assistant corporation counsel shall sign the transcript and state on the record the fact of the waiver, illness, absence of the witness, or the refusal to sign, together with the reason, if any, given therefor.

    (5) The officer shall certify on the transcript that the witness was duly sworn by the officer and that the transcript is a true record of the testimony given by the witness, and the officer or assistant corporation counsel shall promptly deliver or send the transcript by registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the custodian.

    (6) Upon request, the assistant corporation counsel shall furnish a copy of the transcript at no cost to the witness only: except, that the Corporation Counsel may for good cause limit such witness to inspection of the official transcript of the witness's testimony.

    (7) Any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony pursuant to this section may be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel. Counsel may advise such person, in confidence, either upon the request of such person or upon counsel's own initiative, with respect to any question asked of such person. Such person or counsel may object on the record to any question, in whole or in part, and shall briefly state for the record the reason for the objection. An objection may properly be made, received, and entered upon the record when a claim is made that such person is entitled to refuse to answer the question on grounds of any constitutional or other legal right or privilege, including the privilege against self-incrimination. Such person shall not otherwise object to or refuse to answer any question, and shall not by himself or through counsel otherwise interrupt the oral examination. If such person refuses to answer any question, the Corporation Counsel may petition the Superior Court of the District of Columbia pursuant to this section for an order compelling such person to answer such question. If such person refuses to answer any question on the grounds of privilege against self-incrimination, the testimony of such person may be compelled by order of court upon the granting of immunity. No testimony or other disclosure compelled under court order or any information directly or indirectly derived from such ordered testimony or disclosure may be used against the person in any criminal case except a prosecution for perjury or otherwise failing to comply with the order.

    (8) Any person appearing for oral examination pursuant to a demand served under this section shall be entitled to the same mileage reimbursements which are paid to witnesses in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

    (h) Whenever any person fails to comply with any civil investigative demand duly served upon that person under this section or whenever satisfactory copying or reproduction of any such material cannot be done and such person refuses to surrender such material, the Corporation Counsel may file, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and serve upon such person a petition for an order of such court for the enforcement of this chapter. A person who, with the intent to avoid, prevent, or obstruct compliance, in whole or in part, with an investigative demand duly and properly made under this section, withholds, misrepresents, removes from any place, conceals, covers up, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material, answers to written interrogatories, or oral testimony which is the subject of such demand, or who attempts to do so or solicits another to do so shall upon conviction thereof be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one (1) year or both.

    (i) Within 20 days after the service of any such civil investigative demand upon any person, or at any time before the return date specified in the demand, whichever period is shorter, or within such period exceeding 20 days after service or in excess of such return date as may be prescribed in writing, subsequent to service, by any antitrust investigator named in the demand, such person may file in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and serve upon the Corporation Counsel a petition for an order of such court modifying or setting aside such demand. The time allowed for compliance with the demand in whole or in part as deemed proper and ordered by the court shall not run during the pendency of such petition in the court, except that such person shall comply with any portion of the demand not sought to be modified or set aside. Such petition shall specify each ground upon which the petitioner relies in seeking such relief, and may be based upon any failure of such demand to comply with the provisions of this section, or upon any constitutional or other legal right or privilege of such person.

    (j) At any time during which any custodian is in custody or control of any documentary material or answers to interrogatories delivered, or transcripts of oral testimony given by any person in compliance with any such demand, such person may file, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, and serve upon such custodian a petition for an order of such court requiring the performance by such custodian of any duty imposed upon the custodian by this section.

    (k) Any procedure, other than an action to enforce a demand pursuant to subsection (h) of this section, or testimony taken or material produced under this section or voluntarily in the course of an investigation shall be exempt from the provisions of the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act (section 2-531 et seq.) and shall be kept confidential by the Corporation Counsel before bringing an action against a person under this chapter for the violation under investigation, unless confidentiality is waived by the person who has testified, answered interrogatories, or produced material: except, that testimony taken or material or information produced under this section may be disclosed by the Corporation Counsel to any officer or employee of any federal or state law enforcement agency upon the prior certification of an officer of any such federal or state law enforcement agency that such testimony, material, or information will be maintained in confidence and will be used only for official law enforcement purposes.

    (l) Unless otherwise authorized or required by law, any employee of the District of Columbia who shall intentionally disclose information kept confidential by subsection (k) of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $500.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368; Apr. 9, 1997, D.C. Law 11-255, § 27(dd), 44 DCR 1271.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4505.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

    Law 11-255, the "Second Technical Amendments Act of 1996," was introduced in Council and assigned Bill No. 11-905, which was referred to the Committee of the Whole. The Bill was adopted on first and second readings on November 7, 1996, and December 3, 1996, respectively. Signed by the Mayor on December 24, 1996, it was assigned Act No. 11-519 and transmitted to both Houses of Congress for its review. D.C. Law 11-255 became effective on April 9, 1997.

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  • Every person who violates section 28-4502 or 28-4503 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $50,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding one (1) year, or both. The Corporation Counsel shall commence and try all prosecutions for violations of section 28-4502 or 28-4503. Whenever a corporation violates section 28-4502 or 28-4503, the individual directors, officers, or agents of such corporation who have intentionally authorized, ordered or ratified the acts constituting such violation shall be punishable in accordance with this section.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4506.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • (a) Whenever the District of Columbia government is injured in its business or property by a violation of this chapter, the Corporation Counsel may bring a civil action in the name of the District of Columbia for damages, or for appropriate injunctive or other equitable relief, or for both, without prejudice to the right of the District of Columbia to bring similar or identical actions under any other statute. In such an action, in addition to any appropriate injunctive or equitable relief, the court may award the District of Columbia damages and the cost of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees.

    (b) The Corporation Counsel may bring a civil action in the name of the District of Columbia as parens patriae on behalf of any individual residing in the District of Columbia in any court of competent jurisdiction for injury sustained by such individual to such individual's property by reason of any violation of this chapter.

    (1) The court shall award the District of Columbia, as monetary relief, threefold the total damages sustained by such natural persons, and the cost of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees.

    (2) Monetary relief recovered in an action under this subsection shall:

    (A) be distributed in such manner as the court may authorize; or

    (B) be deemed a civil penalty by the court and deposited with the District of Columbia, subject in either case to the requirement that any distribution procedures adopted shall first afford each person a reasonable opportunity to secure each such person's appropriate portion of the net monetary relief.

    (c)(1) In any action brought under subsection (b) of this section, the Corporation Council shall, at such times, in such manner, and with such content as the court may direct, cause notice to be given by publication. If the court finds that notice given solely by publication would deny due process of law to any person or persons, the court shall direct further notice to such person or persons according to the circumstances of the case.

    (2) Any person on whose behalf an action is brought under subsection (b) of this section may elect to exclude from adjudication the portion of the District of Columbia claim for monetary relief attributable to that person by filing notice of such election with the court within such time as specified in the notice given pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection.

    (d) In any action under subsection (b) of this section, in which there has been a determination that a defendant violated a provision of this chapter, damages may be proved and assessed in the aggregate by the computation of illegal overcharges, or by such other reasonable system of estimating aggregate damages as the court may permit, without the necessity of separately proving the individual claim of, or amount of damage to, persons on whose behalf the suit was brought.

    (e) The court may award under this section, pursuant to a motion by the District of Columbia promptly made, simple interest on actual damages for the period beginning on the date of service of the pleading of the District of Columbia setting forth a claim under this chapter and ending on the date of judgment, or for any shorter period therein, if the court finds that the award of such interest for such period is just under the circumstances. In determining whether an award of interest under this section for any period is just under the circumstances, the court shall consider only:

    (1) whether the District of Columbia or the opposing party, or either party's representative, made motions or asserted claims or defenses so lacking in merit as to show that such party or representative acted intentionally for delay, or otherwise acted in bad faith;

    (2) whether, in the course of the action involved, the District of Columbia or the opposing party, or either party's representative, violated any applicable rule, statute, or court order providing for sanctions for dilatory behavior or otherwise providing for expeditious proceedings; and

    (3) whether the District of Columbia or the opposing party, or either party's representative, engaged in conduct primarily for the purpose of delaying the litigation or increasing the cost thereof.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368; Apr. 9, 1997, D.C. Law 11-255, § 27(ee), 44 DCR 1271.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4507.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 11-255, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4506.

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  • (a) Any person who is injured in that person's business or property by reason of anything forbidden by this chapter may bring a civil action for damages, for appropriate injunctive or other equitable relief, or for both. In such an action, in addition to any appropriate injunctive or equitable relief, the court shall award as monetary relief: (1) threefold the total damage sustained by such person; and (2) as determined by the court, the costs of suit including reasonable attorney's fees.

    (b) The court may award under this section, pursuant to a motion by such person promptly made, simple interest on actual damages for the period beginning on the date of service of such person's pleading setting forth a claim under this chapter and ending on the date of judgment, or for any shorter period therein, if the court finds that the award of such interest for such period is just under the circumstances. In determining whether an award of interest under this section for any period is just under the circumstances, the court shall consider only:

    (1) whether such person or the opposing party, or either party's representative, made motions or asserted claims or defenses so lacking in merit as to show that such party or representative acted intentionally for delay, or otherwise acted in bad faith;

    (2) whether, in the course of the action involved, such person or the opposing party, or either party's representative, violated any applicable rule, statute, or court order providing for sanctions for dilatory behavior or otherwise providing for expeditious proceedings; and

    (3) whether such person or the opposing party, or either party's representative, engaged in conduct primarily for the purpose of delaying the litigation or increasing the cost thereof.

    (c) In any class action brought under this section by purchasers or sellers, the fact of injury and the amount of damages sustained by the members of the class may be proven on a class-wide basis, without requiring proof of such matters by each individual member of the class. The percentage of total damages attributable to a member of such class shall be the same as the ratio of such member's purchases or sales to the purchases or sales of the class as a whole.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4508.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • (a) Any indirect purchaser in the chain of manufacture, production, or distribution of goods or services, upon proof of payment of all or any part of any overcharge for such goods or services, shall be deemed to be injured within the meaning of this chapter.

    (b) In actions where both direct and indirect purchasers are involved, a defendant shall be entitled to prove as a partial or complete defense to a claim for damages that the illegal overcharge has been passed on to others who are themselves entitled to recover so as to avoid duplication of recovery of damages.

    (c) In any case in which claims are asserted by both direct purchasers and indirect purchasers, the court may transfer and consolidate cases, apportion damages and delay disbursement of damages to avoid multiplicity of suits and duplication of recovery of damages, and to obtain substantial fairness.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4509.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • A final judgment or decree determining that a person has violated this chapter in an action brought by the District of Columbia under section 28-4506, other than a consent judgment or decree entered before any testimony at trial has been taken or entered pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere, shall be prima facie evidence against such person in any other action against such person under section 28-4508 or 28-4509 as to all matters with respect to which the judgment or decree would be an estoppel between the parties to that judgment or decree.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4510.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • (a) An action under section 28-4506 to recover a criminal penalty is barred if the action is not commenced within four (4) years after the commission of an act constituting in whole or in part the offense or wrongful action charged.

    (b) An action under section 28-4507 or 28-4508 to recover damages is barred if the action is not commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action accrues, or within one (1) year after the conclusion of any timely action brought by the District of Columbia under section 28-4506, based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in the action for damages under section 28-4507 or 28-4508, whichever is later.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4511.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • (a) In enforcing this chapter, the Corporation Counsel may accept an assurance of discontinuance of an act or practice considered in violation of this chapter from any person engaged in the act or practice.

    (b) The assurance of discontinuance shall be in writing and shall be effective only upon the approval of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

    (c) The assurance of discontinuance may not be considered for any purpose as an admission of a violation. Proof of failure to comply with the assurance of discontinuance is prima facie evidence of a violation of this chapter.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4512.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • Except as provided in section 28-4505(k), the Corporation Counsel may cooperate with the federal government and the states in the enforcement of this chapter.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4513.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • The remedies provided for in this chapter are cumulative.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4514.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • It is the intent of the Council of the District of Columbia that in construing this chapter, a court of competent jurisdiction may use as a guide interpretations given by federal courts to comparable antitrust statutes.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4515.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368; Dec. 7, 2004, D.C. Law 15-205, § 3302, 51 DCR 8441; Sept. 14, 2011, D.C. Law 19-21, § 9003(b), 58 DCR 6226.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4516.

    Emergency Act Amendments

    For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 3302 of Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2004 (D.C. Act 15-486, August 2, 2004, 51 DCR 8236).

    For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 3302 of Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Support Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2004 D.C. Act 15-594, October 26, 2004, 51 DCR 11725).

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

    Law 15-205, the "Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Support Act of 2004", was introduced in Council and assigned Bill No. 15-768, which was referred to the Committee of the Whole. The Bill was adopted on first and second readings on May 14, 2004, and June 29, 2004, respectively. Signed by the Mayor on August 2, 2004, it was assigned Act No. 15-487 and transmitted to both Houses of Congress for its review. D.C. Law 15-205 became effective on December 7, 2004.

    For history of Law 19-21, see notes under § 28-3911.

    Miscellaneous Notes

    Short title of subtitle C of title III of Law 15-205: Section 3301 of D.C. Law 15-205 provided that subtitle C of title III of the act may be cited as the Antitrust Fund Cap Increase Act of 2004.

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  • If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4517.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.

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  • Nothing contained in this chapter shall be applicable to conduct or activity specifically regulated, permitted, or required by any regulatory body, agency, or commission acting under statutory authority of the District of Columbia or the United States.

    (Mar. 5, 1981, D.C. Law 3-169, § 2, 27 DCR 5368.)

    HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

    Prior Codifications

    1981 Ed., § 28-4518.

    Legislative History of Laws

    For legislative history of D.C. Law 3-169, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 28-4501.